11. Redundancy
What is redundancy?
Not every situation in which employees lose their jobs through no fault of their own is covered by redundancy law and confusingly, "redundancy" has two different meanings. One is used to establish an individual's right to a redundancy payment and to be fairly dismissed, and the other is used for the purposes of collective consultation.
The right not to be unfairly dismissed for redundancy and to be paid a redundancy payment (if you qualify) is governed by section 139 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 96). This says an employee is dismissed for redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly because:
• the employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for which the employee was employed, or to carry on that business in the place where the employee was employed; or
• the requirements of the business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or to carry it out in the place where they are employed, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.
If either of these conditions are met, there will be what the employment tribunal describes as a "genuine redundancy situation".
In other words, the basic test for individual redundancy dismissals is whether the employer requires fewer (or no) employees to do work of a particular kind or in a particular location. It is not enough that the work itself has ceased or diminished. There must be a need for fewer (or no) employees to carry out work. The expiry of a fixed-term contract can also amount to redundancy.
There can be a genuine redundancy situation even if it is not your role that is being cut, but someone else's, as long as the employer has a need for fewer employees to carry out work. In other words, the law allows a practice known a "bumping", where another employee whose role is redundant is moved into your role and you are dismissed instead (Lionel Leventhal v North UKEAT/0265/04). As long as your dismissal is as a result of a genuine redundancy situation, it does not matter that it is not your role that is made redundant. There will, however, still be a separate question as to whether the dismissal is fair. This is looked at further below.
A job change resulting from a reorganisation or a change of duties will not necessarily be a redundancy. It depends on the kind of work an employee is required to do before and after the change of duties. The test is always whether the statutory definition (above) has been met.
Mr Murphy was a plumber at Epsom College. The college installed a new heating system which he was not qualified to operate. The college decided to employ a residential heating engineer instead of a plumber. As a result, Mr Murphy was dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the tribunal's conclusion that he had been dismissed because of redundancy. The requirement for a plumber had ceased or diminished. In its place, there was a new requirement for a heating engineer ().
Murphy v Epsom College [1984] IRLR 271
A dismissal of employees and their replacement with self-employed workers, franchisees or agency workers will be a redundancy situation, even where the agency workers are taken on to do exactly the same kind of work as the dismissed employees were doing (Bromby & Hoare Limited v Evans [1972] ICR113; Hodgkins v CJB Development Limited [1984] EAT/948/83). This is because the statutory test is whether the employer needs fewer or no employees to do work of a particular kind.
The employer does not have to show an economic justification for a decision to make redundancies, or that financial problems have led to the drop in work. Indeed, there will still be a redundancy where a successful employer with plenty of work decides to reorganise the business if the outcome is fewer staff (Kingswell and others v Elizabeth Bradley Designs EAT/0661/02).
However, the business jusification for a redundancy is still relevant, because a tribunal will want to be sure that redundancy is the genuine reason for the dismissal, and not some other hidden reason, such as concerns about performance.
If an employee has always worked in one place and is no longer required for work in that place, this can still be a redundancy even if there is a "mobility clause" in the contract saying that s/he can be made to work in other locations (High Table Ltd v Horst [1997] EWCA Civ 2000 ([1997] IRLR 513)). This is because the test for redundancy is factual, asking: what were the employer's requirements for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or in a particular place, at the time of the dismissal? (Murray v Foyle Meats Limited [1999] UKHL 30).
However, reps should be very cautious about mobility clauses, not least because a more recent case, Home Office v Evans & Laidlaw [2007] EWCA Civ 1089, has cast doubt on this established position. In this case, the Home Office was allowed to rely on a contractual mobility clause to avoid redundancies, arguing successfully that two employees who refused to relocate to a different office following a branch closure were dismissed for refusing to obey a lawful order, rather than for redundancy, because the contract allowed the employer to require the employees to relocate.
Employees should be very wary if, instead of being made redundant, they are instructed to relocate to a different branch or location. As well as the risk that a refusal to move might result in a fair dismissal for misconduct (refusing to obey a lawful order), or for "some other substantial reason" (see Chapter 10: Dismissal), there is a danger that an offer of a new role in a different location could be "suitable alternative employment", removing the entitlement to a redundancy payment (see Alternative employment below).
Although challenging redundancy dismissals is often very difficult, because a tribunal will not generally interfere in "business decisions" and because employers are allowed a great deal of latitude when carrying out redundancy selection, nevertheless, a redundancy may be unfair because of the selection process, inadequate consultation or a failure to offer alternative work. This is looked at further below, see Unfair dismissal and redundancy.
More information: see LRD booklet: Redundancy law - a practical guide (2011) £10.40.
Consultation
An employer has a legal obligation to consult over collective redundancies if it proposes to dismiss as redundant 20 or more employees at one establishment within a 90-day period. This law is set out in Chapter II (section 188 onwards) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA). In Northern Ireland the same rules are contained in Part XIII of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (article 216 onwards).
The TULRCA provisions on collective redundancies do not apply to Crown employees (those working for a government department or carrying out its functions). However, civil servants have consultation rights under their civil service redundancy policy.
Even if there is no statutory duty to consult over collective redundancies because fewer than 20 employees are affected, the employer must still consult with any individuals who are at risk of redundancy. A failure to consult an individual at risk of redundancy can make the dismissal unfair. There is a duty to consult even on the expiry of a fixed-term contract (University of Glasgow v Donaldson and McAnally EAT/951/94).
To calculate whether the proposed number of redundancies is 20 or more, you can only include the employees in that establishment. According to the ECJ, an "establishment" is the unit to which workers are assigned to carry out their duties, whether or not there is a separate management (Rockfon v Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark C-449/93 [1996] IRLR 168). There is no definition of "establishment" in TULRCA and this can result in serious injustice, as illustrated by recent experiences of staff following the collapse of the Woolworths retail chain.
After retail chain Woolworths went into administration in 2008, the insolvency practitioners failed to consult with USDAW, the recognised union. USDAW brought a successful application for protective awards, winning £67.8 million for 24,000 Woolworths' employees. However, 3,000 employees received no compensation because the Employment Tribunal decided they had been employed in separate shops, each employing under 20 employees.
The tribunal justified its decision on the basis that each store had its own organisation and distinct purpose, and that staff worked at particular stores and did not move between stores. Its finding is surprising, especially since functions like accounting and human resources were probably managed centrally and the stores were probably not capable of operating independently of head office.
The government is consulting on whether to introduce either a definition, or (more probably) a list of common factors that can be used to work out whether there is an establishment in any given situation.
In MSF v Refuge Assurance plc & another ([2002] IRLR 324), the EAT held that field staff in an insurance company were assigned to their local branch office, meaning that the duty to consult was only triggered if 20 or more redundancies were proposed within one branch office. But in Mills & Allen v Bulwich EAT/154/99, the EAT held that a nationwide direct sales team was a single establishment, even though sales staff worked out of different offices around the country, so that when 24 redundancies were proposed nationwide, there was a duty to consult the union.
The test that triggers the duty to consult collectively is whether 20 or more redundancy dismissals are proposed at the start of the consultation process. The fact that fewer than 20 employees end up being dismissed is irrelevant. This is not surprising, since one of the key purposes of collective consultation is for union and employer to work together to find ways to avoid compulsory redundancies:
Sarah Hardy was one of 26 employees told they would be made redundant when their office closed. Her employer argued that since it expected to redeploy most of them elsewhere in the business, making only 12 redundant, the collective consultation requirements did not apply. The EAT disagreed. An employer "proposes to dismiss" if it proposes to terminate existing contracts. Even if new jobs were to be offered to some staff, they would be at a different location and involve different duties. This amounted to a proposal to dismiss, triggering the duty to consult.
Hardy v Tourism South East UKEAT/0931/04 ([2005] IRLR 242
The definition of redundancy for the purposes of collective consultation is much wider than the statutory definition for individual redundancies set out at the start of this chapter. It is any "dismissal for a reason not related to the individual concerned".
The result of this wider definition is that the union may have a right to be consulted over dismissals even if they do not meet the definition of redundancy under section 139 of the ERA. In particular, there can still be a redundancy dismissal for the purposes of collective consultation where the same number of employees remain employed. The test does not require a reduction in the employer's requirement for employees.
In GMB v Man Truck and Bus UK Ltd EAT/971/99 ([2000] IRLR 636), the EAT confirmed that the dismissal of employees and their re-engagement on new terms and conditions gives rise to collective redundancy consultation rights, even though there is no proposed reduction in the number of employees.
The termination of fixed term contracts can also trigger the duty to consult collectively (see Lancaster University v UCU [2010] UKEAT 0278/10/2710). However, not all terminations of fixed term contracts trigger a duty to consult collectively. The test is whether or not the termination is "for a reason…related to the individual concerned". The duty to consult collectively is not triggered when fixed term contracts end "for reasons relating to the individual", such as the ending of a maternity cover or the completion of a specific time-limited project (University of Stirling v UCU UKEATS/0001/11/B1).
For further information see Redundancy law - a practical guide (LRD 2011).
The mechanics of collective consultation
Where there is a proposal to dismiss 20 or more employees for redundancy, the employer must consult the appropriate representatives of any employees likely to be made redundant.
Where a union is recognised, the appropriate representatives are representatives of the union. Trade union representatives have the right to paid time off to take part in consultation.
Consultation must be with all recognised unions even if members of one union will not be affected (Governing Body NI Hotel and Catering College v NATFHE [1995] IRLR 83).
Where there is no recognised union, the appropriate representatives can be either:
• representatives of affected employees appointed or elected generally for consultation and information purposes (i.e. a standing representative body or staff association) or
• employee representatives elected by affected employees solely for the purpose of redundancy consultation.
If there is no recognised union or existing non-union representative body, the employer must organise elections for representatives, following a procedure set out in TULRCA. This requires the employer to invite all employees at risk of redundancy to elect employee representatives "long enough before the time when the consultation is required". The election process must comply with rules set out in section 188A of TULRCA.
Where the number of candidates putting themselves forward for election precisely matches the number of representatives required (so that there is no contest) there is no absolute requirement to hold a ballot (Phillips v Xtera Communications Limited (UKEAT/0244/DM)).
If an employer has issued an invitation in good time asking affected employees to elect representatives and they have failed to do this, the employer must provide specific statutory information to each individual affected employee.
Employee representatives (and candidates for election) are protected against unfair dismissal and detrimental treatment.
Employees are entitled to reasonable time off to act as reps or candidates. They must be allowed access to employees and be provided with accommodation and other appropriate facilities. In 2010, Acas updated its Code of Practice on Time off for trade union duties and activities, which contains guidance on appropriate facilities to be provided to trade union reps.
Acas has also produced a Redundancy handling guide, which can be downloaded from the Acas website, containing useful guidance for both union and non-union reps.
More information: See the LRD booklet Time off for trade union duties and activities - a legal guide (£5.75).
The Acas Code of Practice on Time off for trade union duties and activities (2010) is available to download at: www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/n/k/Acas_Code_of_Practice_Part-3-accessible-version-July-2011.pdf
When does consultation begin?
Consultation must take place "in good time". If 100 or more employees at one establishment are to be dismissed, consultation must begin at least 90 days before the first redundancy takes effect. If the numbers involved are more than 20 but fewer than 100, the minimum consultation period is reduced to 30 days.
But these are minimum periods. Sometimes employers will need to start consultation earlier than that. They should not wait until the statutory clock starts ticking (Elkouil v Coney Island [2002] IRLR 174). Even if the employer is looking at two options and only one of them involves redundancies, there is still an obligation to consult (Scotch Premier Meat v Burns [2000] IRLR 639).
Consultation must take place when proposals are still at a "formative stage". This is so that the union can genuinely exercise its influence and has time to respond to proposals and make counter-suggestions (Amicus v Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd EAT/0184/05).
The law on this issue of crucial importance to trade unionists - when must consultation start - is currently in a state of uncertainty. At the time of writing, the leading case remains UK Coal Mining Limited v National Union of Mineworkers (Northumberland Area) [2008] ICR 163. In this case, the EAT ruled that the obligation to consult collectively is triggered as soon as there is a clear (albeit provisional) proposal (for example, to close a plant) which would almost inevitably result in redundancies, as opposed to when a strategy such as closure is merely "mooted as a possibility". In other words, the NUM decision requires consultation on whether or not to take the strategic decision (e.g. plant closure) that would result in the redundancies.
Ellington Colliery was closed after water began to rise quickly at a coal seam. Two weeks later, management told NUM reps the mine needed urgent closure on both safety and economic grounds. A report revealing that the water posed no safety risk was withheld from the union and 158 men were made compulsorily redundant following minimal consultation on peripheral issues like alternative employment opportunities and redundancy pay.
The EAT held that the employer's duty to consult about ways of avoiding the dismissalsinevitably meant engaging with the underlying reasons for the dismissals. This, in turn, demanded consultation with the union over the decision to close the mine in the first place. A protective award of the maximum 90 days pay was awarded because the company deliberately set out to mislead the union as to the real reason for the dismissals, and engaged in limited consultation over marginal issues.
UK Coal Mining Limited v National Union of Mineworkers (Northumberland Area) [2008] ICR 163
The issue resurfaced in United States of America v Nolan (see facts set out below). The Court of Appeal referred Nolan to the ECJ which has been asked to rule whether:
(1) the obligation to engage in collective consultation starts once the employer has made a provisional strategic decision which, if implemented, is likely to result in redundancies (following the UK Coal Mining case above); or alternatively, whether:
(2) the obligation to consult is only triggered once the strategic decision (for example, to close the mine) has been taken and the employer is proposing consequential redundancies.
A decision of the ECJ is expected in late 2012. However, reps should note that preliminary indications are not encouraging. In March 2012, the Attorney General (AG) to the ECJ published his Opinion, which includes the view that the duty to start collective consultation is only triggered once a "strategic or commercial decision" has been taken which compels the employer to plan for collective redundancies.
In other words, the AG is suggesting that there is no duty to consult with the union on whether or not to make the strategic decision (such as to close a plant) which leads to the redundancies being needed. However, the AG's opinion is not binding on the ECJ, which has, in previous cases, decided not to follow it.
The US army was considering closing its base at Hythe, with the loss of 200 civilian jobs. It did not start consulting with the workforce until it had already taken the strategic decision to close the base. Reps brought a claim against the US government for a protective award, arguing that the obligation to consult was triggered as soon as the US government had formed a "clear, albeit provisional intention" to close the base. The Court of Appeal has referred this issue to the ECJ (see above).
United States of America v Nolan [2011] IRLR 40
The timing of dismissal notices
An employer cannot give notice of redundancy before the consultation process has been completed.
Irmtraud Junk was a care assistant in a large organisation providing domestic care services. Her employer began insolvency proceedings and all employees were informed that their employment would end in three months, which was the end of the collective consultation period. The ECJ held that the consultation must have been completed before the employer can make a decision to terminate the contracts of employment. Notifying an employee at the start of, or during the consultation period, that the contract of employment has been terminated, albeit with notice, means that a decision has already been taken. By then, it is too late to consult. This goes against the whole purpose of consultation, which is to avoid or reduce redundancies.
Junk v Kuhnel C-188/03 ([2005] IRLR 310
Information to be provided by the employer
For the purposes of consultation, the employer must provide adequate information. Specifically, section 188(4) of TULRA requires the employer to give reps the following information in writing:
• reason(s) for the redundancies
• number and descriptions of employees proposed to be made redundant
• total number of employees of any description
• proposed selection procedure
• proposed method for carrying out redundancy dismissals including timescale, and
• proposals for calculating redundancy pay, if it is to exceed the statutory minimum.
The obligation to start consultation does not depend on the employer being able to supply reps with this statutory information (Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry and others v Fujitsu Siemens Computers Oy (C-44/08)). Instead, the employer must provide this information promptly during the consultation period, as it becomes available.
A parent company's failure to supply a subsidiary with this information will not justify a failure to consult (section 188(7) TULRCA).
Where decisions on collective redundancy are taken within a group of companies, the duty to consult is always owed by the employing subsidiary, even if, in practice, redundancy decisions are taken by head office. The duty to consult is triggered as soon as the parent company decides that redundancies are to be located within a particular subsidiary (Akavan v Fujitsu (C-44/08)).
Obligation to notify BIS
The employer must notify the Secretary of State of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) of all proposed redundancies of 20 or more employees. This is done using an HR1 form which is sent to the Redundancy Payments Office, a division of BIS. The timeframe for this step mirrors the 30/90-day consultation time period.
What must consultation cover?
The law obliges employers to consult about ways of:
• avoiding dismissals;
• reducing the number of employees to be dismissed; and
• mitigating the consequences of the dismissals.
In R v British Coal ex parte Price [1994] IRLR 72, the High Court held that fair consultation must include:
• consultation when the proposals are at a formative stage;
• adequate information on which to respond;
• adequate time in which to consider proposals and to respond; and
• conscientious consideration of the response.
Consultation must be sufficient and meaningful, real and not a sham. The employer must consider representations and reply to them. Current law requires consultation to encompass the business reasons for any proposed change, closure or relocation (see the discussion of the UK Coal Mining case).
An employer who decides to make redundancies before consulting with reps is not engaging in meaningful consultation and is likely to be subject to a protective award (Middlesbrough BC v T&G and UNISON [2002] IRLR 332).
"Meaningful" consultation should include exploration of all ideas reasonably suggested by the union to avoid redundancies, reduce their number and mitigate their effects. These could include, for example:
• finding savings elsewhere in the organisation;
• recruitment freezes;
• cuts to agency staff;
• temporary cuts to overtime or discretionary benefits;
• short term salary freezes or pay cuts (which could be targeted progressively so that the impact is shared across the organisation, instead of falling on the lowest earners);
• temporary flexible working arrangements;
• sabbaticals, secondment, unpaid leave, increased part-time work, home working to reduce overhead, job shares.
Failure to explore all reasonable ideas will expose the employer to the risk of a protective award.
Consultation must be with a view to reaching agreement (section 188(2) of TULRCA). This means that genuine consultation should be "tantamount to a negotiation" (see Junk v Khunel). This does not mean that at the end of the discussion, both parties must be in agreement, but it does mean that they should carry out their talks in a spirit of seeking agreement.
An employer who makes it clear from the outset that redundancy proposals are non-negotiable is at a high risk of a protective award.
The mere fact that the employer has held meetings with the reps is not sufficient to establish fair consultation (King v Eaton [1996] IRLR 199).
In Ferguson v Prestwick Circuits ([1992] IRLR 266), the employer argued that previous experience suggested employees did not like consultation. This did not absolve the employer of the duty to consult.
Even if an employer reasonably believes there is no alternative to redundancy, it must still consult. For example, the employee may know something that alters the situation (Heron v Citylink [1993] IRLR 372).
Protective award
Special circumstances
A tribunal should make a protective award unless the employer can point to "special circumstances" making it not reasonably practicable to consult. Even if the employer can point to special circumstances, it must still be able to demonstrate that it took all reasonably practicable steps to comply. Tribunals tend to interpret this defence narrowly. Special circumstances must be something unforeseen or unexpected.
"Special circumstances" do not provide an absolute defence to a claim for a protective award, but they can reduce its size, or even, in some circumstances, eliminate the award altogether, depending on the employer's efforts to consult effectively in the time available.
Alstom sub-contracted engineering construction firm Shanahan to build a new generator. As the work was short-term, some redundancies at the end of the project had already been anticipated, and Shanahan and Unite, the recognised union, had pre-agreed a selection process for those redundancies, ready for when the time came.
But an unexpected problem with site congestion caused a health and safety concern that needed resolving urgently, so Shanahan selected 50 people for redundancy within three days, using the already agreed selection criteria.
The EAT agreed "special circumstances" released Shanahan from the duty to carry out a full 30 day consultation. However, the EAT confirmed that Shanahan was at fault in failing to make any attempt at consultation at all, even if just over a few days.
Shanahan Engineering Ltd v UNITE the Union UKEAT/0411/09
An employer cannot escape its duty to consult in good time by claiming it did not have all necessary information. If some information is available, it must be consulted over (GMB and Amicus v Beloit Walmsley EAT/1094/02 [2004] IRLR 18).
Insolvency is not, by itself, a special circumstance entitling the employer to avoid consultation (Iron and Steel Trades Confederation v ASW Holdings [2004] IRLR 926). However, the amount of the protective award will be capped in cases of insolvency and is payable by the Redundancy Payments Office, a division of the Department for Business Innovation and Skills out of the National Insurance Fund (section 182 ERA96).
The employer is still be liable for a protective award even if it believes consultation would have made no difference to the outcome (Sovereign Distribution Services v TGWU [1989] IRLR 334) and even if a company goes into receivership (AEEU/GMB v Clydesdale Group [1995] IRLR 527).
The coalition government is proposing wide-ranging changes to limit the protection given to workers through the collective consultation mechanism. Its proposals are being fiercely resisted by unions.
In November 2011, the government launched a call for evidence on the collective redundancy consultation rules, focusing in particular, on the following issues:
• the conduct of consultation: what difference does consultation make, what factors make it easier or harder to conclude consultation;
• the meaning of "establishment";
• the duration of the consultation period: the government wants to reduce the 90-day period. It does not intend to change the 30-day period;
• so-called "high impact" redundancies i.e. redundancies in sectors or regions with fewer job opportunities, especially redundancies by a single large employer, where the effects of economic shock may impact particularly harshly on an economy or sector;
• the relationship between collective redundancy and TUPE consultation obligations, especially the current ban on a prospective purchaser beginning redundancy consultation with the transferring workforce until after the transfer has taken place.
Remedies for failure to consult
If an employer does not consult adequately or at all with reps, a complaint can be made to the employment tribunal. The complaint must be brought by whoever should have been consulted - either the union or the employee representative.
The tribunal can make a protective award, which is a sum of money paid to each affected employee.
Where there are no elected employee representatives, an individual can only claim a protective award for him or herself and not on behalf of other employees (Independent Insurance Co Limited (in Provisional Liquidation) v Aspinall (UKEAT/0051/11)).
The purpose of a protective award is not to compensate the employees for the loss they have suffered, but to punish the employer for failing to consult (Susie Radin v GMB and others [2004] EWCA Civ 180 ([2004] IRLR 400)). For this reason, it is irrelevant whether or not individual employees have lost out financially as a result of the failure to consult.
The award can be up to 90 days' pay and tribunals should use this as their starting point before examining the surrounding circumstances to see whether there is any justification for reducing it (T&G v Morgan Platts EAT/0646/02). This maximum applies even if the minimum consultation period was 30 days:
A tribunal made a protective award of 80 days' pay to members of the T&G general union after their employer failed to consult over the proposed redundancy of 30-35 workers. The employer argued that the award was too high, given that the mandatory period of consultation for 20 to 99 redundancies is only 30 days. The EAT held that a protective award of up to 90 days' pay can be made even when fewer than 100 employees are to be made redundant.
As the award is punitive and not compensatory, what matters is the seriousness of the employer's breach of its consultation duty.
Newage Transmission v TGWU EAT/0131/05
Except in cases of insolvency, protective awards are calculated using actual earnings and there is no statutory cap. This means that especially in large scale redundancies, protective awards can be very large indeed. The threat of a protective award can be a potent weapon to force a reluctant employer to engage in proper consultation with a recognised union.
For more details and examples see Redundancy law - a practical guide, LRD 2011.
Selection for redundancy
In many workplaces where unions operate, there will be an agreed procedure for redundancy selection. A selection procedure is rarely contractual. This means that changes to it will rarely be a breach of contract. By contrast, an agreed policy on enhanced redundancy payments is more likely to be contractual (see Establishing a contractual right).
A landmark EAT decision, Williams v Compair Maxim ([1982] IRLR 83), laid down some basic guidelines for employers to follow to carry out a fair redundancy dismissal. These guidelines are intended to apply regardless of the number of employees at risk. They are:
• give as much warning as possible of likely redundancies;
• consult reps on the best way of causing as little hardship as possible to employees;
• draw up agreed selection criteria;
• as far as possible, make sure chosen criteria can be verified objectively (for example, via attendance records) rather than relying on the subjective opinion of the manager doing the selecting;
• carry out the selection exercise fairly, following the agreed criteria;
• consider any representations; and
• offer alternative employment where possible.
A recent case, Morgan v Welsh Rugby Union (UKEAT/0314/10), has suggested that the Compair Maxim approach is not suitable for a redundancy situation arising out of a restructuring, where roles are eliminated, new roles created and staff compete for the "new" jobs. The case draws a distinction between "selection for redundancy" and "offers of alternative employment" following redundancy. In practical terms, this is a difficult distinction for unions, as more and more redundancy consultation exercises are configured as restructurings, creating "new" jobs and maximising the employer's flexibility.
According to Morgan, an employer creating new jobs in a restructuring is likely to want to focus on a candidate's ability to perform the new role in the future, and as a result, the selection process can look much more like a job interview than a consultation meeting, allowing the employer freedom to use "a substantial measure of judgment" as to the best candidate, subject to an overriding obligation to act "reasonably and fairly".
Morgan has been followed in Samsung Electronics (UK) Limited v Monte-d'Cruz [2012] UKEAT0039/11. In Samsung, the employer restructured the department, creating a new role for which the claimant and one other employee were invited to apply. Neither met the employer's requirements and an external candidate was appointed. The EAT refused to criticise the employer for using wholly subjective and "nebulous" selection criteria originally designed for an annual appraisal process. The dismissal was fair, even though the employer decided to disregard evidence of past performance from previous annual appraisals, and even though there was no prior agreement between the interviewers as to what the assessment criteria meant, or as to what might be acceptable answers to any of the questions asked.
Choosing the selection pool
An employer has a wide discretion when choosing the selection pool and a challenge on this basis is likely to be very difficult, as long as the employer has applied its mind to the question of who should be in the pool (Fulcrum Pharma v Bonassera [2010] UKEAT/0198/10). A tribunal is only likely to interfere if the decision is so flawed that no reasonable employer could have made it. In a recent example:
An employer employed four actuaries, including Ms Byard. The employer needed to make one redundancy. Many of the pension schemes Ms Byard administered had been wound up or the clients had been lost. Arguing that it was important not to disturb existing client relationships, the employer put Ms Byard in a pool of one, instead of using a pool made up of all four actuaries and selecting between them. The tribunal looked at the evidence and found that the risk of losing clients from changing actuaries was in fact slight, and that the employer had not genuinely applied its mind to deciding who should be in the pool. The tribunal noted that a particularly troubling consequence of the employer's decision to limit the pool was that it removed most of the value of effective consultation for Ms Byard, because it made it impossible for her to argue that someone else should have been selected from the pool instead of her. The EAT agreed and decided that the dismissal was unfair.
Capita Hartshead Limited v Byard [2012] UKEAT 0445/11
An employer's desire to avoid demoralising or worrying other employees by placing them in a pool at risk of redundancy is never a fair reason for limiting the pool.
Choosing selection criteria
An employer has wide discretion in its choice of selection criteria, and a tribunal will only interfere with this choice if it is one that no reasonable employer would have made: in other words, if it falls outside the "band of reasonable responses" of an employer (see Chapter 10: Dismissal).
Redundancy selection and discrimination
Selection criteria must not be discriminatory. If either the criteria or the process discriminates unlawfully on the grounds of sex or pregnancy, race, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief, age, marital status or because of gender reassignment, it can be challenged under the Equality Act 2010 (see Chapter 6).
Employers cannot offer different redundancy pay packages to men and women. Nor can they select for redundancy on discriminatory grounds, for example, by choosing women over men or by allowing redundancies to fall in areas that are predominately female without justification.
Employers can use sickness absence as a criterion for selection but should consider whether adjustments are needed for disabled workers. They will not always be necessary. For example, in Lancaster v TBWA Manchester (UKEAT 0460/10), the EAT decided it was not a "reasonable adjustment" to require the employer to change selection criteria that related to a core requirement of the role, particularly since, on the facts of that case, changing the criteria would have made no difference to the eventual outcome because of Mr Lancaster's low overall score. Mr Lancaster was a senior art director suffering from social anxiety disorder. Subjective selection criteria such as "ability to demonstrate communication skills" placed him at a disadvantage relative to others in the pool competing for a senior level creative post. His redundancy was nevertheless held to be fair.
In Berry v GB Electronics EAT/0882/00, the employer discriminated against Mr Berry, a profoundly deaf employee, by calling him into a meeting to announce his impending redundancy without arranging for a signer to be present.
A selection procedure that discriminates on grounds of age can be objectively justified, as long as it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
In HM Land Registry v Benson UKEAT/0197/11, a decision to offer voluntary redundancy to civil servants at the Land Registry adopting "cost" as the main selection criterion was objectively justifiable as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim in this case. The Registry had an urgent need to relocate to smaller premises and to cut staff numbers and so offered voluntary redundancy to those staff who cost the least to release under the terms of the Civil Service Compensation Scheme, even though this meant that those entitled to the most generous benefits under the scheme - those aged between 50 and 54 - were effectively excluded from the terms of the offer. The EAT cautioned that this decision should not be seen as giving the green light to employers to select on the basis of age-related cost.
HM Land Registry v Benson UKEAT/0197/11
As long as the underlying selection process is fair, then where two employees achieve equal scores, an employer's choice of one of them for redundancy will not be unfair just for this reason (Semple Fraser LLP v Daly UKEATS/0045/09/B1).
It is unlawful to select an individual for redundancy on grounds of their trade union membership or activities.
Selection of individuals because they are part-time workers or fixed-term employees is unlawful unless the employer can show this to be "objectively justified" (see Chapter 2: Part-time workers).
Section 105 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 specifies a number of other reasons for selection that would make a redundancy automatically unfair, see Unfair dismissal and redundancy.
The selection of two employees for having been strike activists was an automatically unfair dismissal (Britool v Roberts [1993] IRLR 481), as was selecting someone for redundancy because they spent too much time on union activities (Dundon v GPT [1995] IRLR 403).
Equally, an employer cannot assess an employee based on skills demonstrated while acting as a safety rep (Smiths Industries v Rawlings [1996] IRLR 656). An employee's duties as a trade union or safety rep should not impact (positively or negatively) on a redundancy selection decision.
But a union rep who was given a different role to accommodate his trade union duties was not unfairly dismissed when he was selected for redundancy from that role, even though there was still a need for work in his original post (O'Dea v ISC Chemicals [1995] IRLR 599).
Last in, first out
Many agreed redundancy procedures use the criterion of last in, first out (LIFO). LIFO protects employees with longer service from being selected before those with shorter service. LIFO agreements have been questioned because of the potential to discriminate. However, it is now generally accepted that using LIFO as one of a number of criteria for selection is acceptable, whereas using it as the only, or the most important criterion is open to challenge. This view is supported by guidance from the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
In Rolls Royce PLC v Unite [2008] EWCH 2420, general union Unite challenged the employer's decision to remove LIFO as one of the selection criteria. The High Court decided that length of service is likely to be a fair indicator of both loyalty and experience, which would not necessarily be covered by other selection criteria. The Court also found that an employer's use of LIFO to help negotiate a peaceable process of selection is likely to support a defence to any claim of age discrimination. The Court agreed with Unite that even though LIFO is a length of service benefit which requires "justification" (see Chapter 6: Age discrimination), it could be justified here because it reasonably fulfilled a business need: to maintain a loyal and stable workforce.
Sex discrimination and selection
It is automatically unfair to select for redundancy on the basis that a woman is pregnant or on maternity leave (section 99 ERA 96, Brown v Stockton on Tees Council [1988] IRLR 263).
In 2011, an important new case, Eversheds Legal Services Limited v de Belin ([2011] UKEAT0352), modified the law on pregnancy and redundancy selection. The effect of this case in the context of redundancy is to require employers to ensure that any protection given to pregnant women and those on maternity leave when selecting for redundancy is no more than is proportionate and necessary.
It is important to ensure employers do not overstate the importance of this case and unlawfully downgrade the protection given to pregnant women and women on maternity leave. In particular, reps should note that this case makes no difference to the special statutory right of a woman made redundant while on maternity leave to be offered any suitable available vacancy (see Alternative work):
Mr de Belin was one of two solicitors in the real estate department of law firm Eversheds. The other was Ms Reinholz. Eversheds decided to make one redundancy and devised selection criteria, one of which was "lock up", meaning the amount of time between doing a piece of work and getting paid for it. To calculate a "lock up" score, Eversheds needed to decide on a reference period. Ms Reinholz was on maternity leave during the firm's chosen reference period, so Eversheds decided to allocate her the maximum possible "lock up" score. As a result of this decision, Ms Reinholz's total score exceeded that of Mr de Belin by only 0.5 points, and Mr de Belin was made redundant.
During consultation, Mr de Belin pointed out the unfairness of this outcome and suggested alternative solutions, such as giving each party a notional score of 1, or using a different reference period, such as the period immediately before Ms Reinholz left for maternity leave. These suggestions were rejected. Mr de Belin brought a claim for direct sex discrimination.
Although sex discrimination legislation prohibits discrimination against both men and women, the law places pregnant women and those on maternity leave in a special position, by stating that when deciding whether "less favourable treatment" has taken place, "no account shall be taken of special treatment afforded to women in connection with pregnancy or childbirth" (now section 13(7) of the Equality Act 2010). In other words, it is not "less favourable treatment" of a man to treat him worse than a woman who is pregnant or on maternity leave. The policy justification for this special treatment is the health and welfare of mother and baby.
In the de Belin case, the EAT accepted that this legislation gives pregnant women and women on maternity leave a right to special treatment, more favourable than the treatment given to other men or women, but went on to decide that this protection must not extend beyond whatever is "reasonably necessary and proportionate" to compensate women for the disadvantage they suffer from being pregnant or on maternity leave. Eversheds' policy of allocating Ms Reinholz the maximum possible score went beyond what was proportionate, especially as there were other options available that would have achieved the aim of the legislation in a more proportionate way, such as those suggested by Mr de Belin during consultation. Mr de Belin's claims for both sex discrimination and unfair dismissal succeeded ().
Eversheds Legal Services Limited v de Belin [2011] UKEAT/0352
It was unlawful sex discrimination to fail to notify staff on a career break of an offer of voluntary redundancy (HM Land Registry v Benson UKEAT/0197/11).
See Chapter 4 of LRD's Redundancy law - a practical guide (2011) for a more detailed look at selection procedures, accompanied by practical examples.
Voluntary redundancy
An employer may ask for volunteers first and would not need to apply the selection procedure to them. But there is no obligation to ask for volunteers, and failing to ask for volunteers will not make compulsory redundancies unfair (Rogers and others v Vosper Thornycroft [1989] IRLR 82).
Voluntary redundancies are treated as dismissals in the same way as compulsory redundancies, provided there is a genuine redundancy situation. However, someone choosing to take voluntary retirement should take care. For example, in Birch & another v University of Liverpool [1985] IRLR 165, the Court of Appeal held that employees accepting early retirement in the face of the threat of compulsory redundancy had terminated their contracts by mutual consent.
Where employees volunteer for redundancies, representatives need to be sure that they are not volunteering just because they believe that discrimination will mean they will not get a fair chance at the available jobs. In Derby Specialist Fabrication v Burton [2001] IRLR 69, the EAT held that an employee who had chosen to volunteer for redundancy for that reason could claim constructive discriminatory dismissal.
Individual consultation
An employer who has provisionally selected an employee for redundancy must write to that employee warning of the risk of redundancy and inviting him or her to a consultation meeting (Alexander and Hatherley v Bridgen Enterprises Ltd [2006] IRLR 422).
Before the meeting, the employer must provide details of selection criteria used, individual scores, and an explanation of the scoring method. The employer must provide an adequate explanation of the scores, to give the employee a genuine opportunity to challenge the decision (Pinewood Repro Limited t/a County Print v Page [2010] UKEAT 0028). Employers do not need to provide the scores of other employees (British Aerospace v Green [1995] IRLR 433).
It is not necessarily unfair to refuse to hand over minutes of a redundancy consultation meeting, or other general documentation produced by the employer during the course of the selection process (Camelot PLC v Hogg UKEATS/0019/10/BI).
Employees have separate rights under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 98) to access this material where it contains personal information about them. Advice on making a Data Subject Access Request can be found on the Information Commissioner's website. The DPA 98 does not entitle workers to data on management planning where this would prejudice the conduct of the business, for example, future plans about redundancy or reorganisation.
In its Guide to redundancy handling, Acas recommends the establishment of a redundancy appeals procedure. Where possible, the manager hearing any appeal should be senior to the original decision maker. In large scale redundancies, employers may use a "sifting" process, requiring employees to appeal in writing initially, identifying the specific issues they want to raise, with only those employees who pass through this sifting process being given a full hearing. As long as the overall selection process is fair, this will not make a dismissal unfair (For an example, see Camelot PLC v Hogg UKEATS/0019/10/BI).
There is no absolute statutory right to a full appeal hearing against a redundancy decision, so employees wishing to appeal should make sure their request for an appeal is as specific as possible, emphasising issues, such as individual scoring, or failure to offer a particular suitable alternative role, which might have made a difference to the final outcome, rather than making general complaints, for example about delay or failure to produce minutes, which while unacceptable, would not have affected the final decision.
Alternative work
An employer should give employees at risk of redundancy the chance to apply for suitable alternative work if available including, where appropriate, vacancies in other companies within the same group. The obligation is stricter in the case of women on maternity or adoption leave, where employers must offer any suitable available vacancy.
If the employer does not consider offering suitable alternative employment, this may make redundancy unfair. Several recent tribunal decisions have shown that the tribunal is prepared to take a relatively robust approach to enforcing the employer's duty to look for suitable alternative work.
An employer should not confine the period of any search to any "formal" consultation period during which an employee is notified that s/he is at risk of redundancy. Instead, the employer should be looking out for alternative employment opportunities from the moment the employer realises that the role is at risk, whether or not that risk has been communicated to the employee. The larger and better resourced the employer, the more that will be expected of it (Richardson v HSBC Bank plc UKEAT/0499/10).
Responsibility for looking for alternative employment rests firmly with the employer, as it holds all the knowledge. However, in practice, the more the employee actively engages with the process of seeking alternative employment, the more sympathetic a tribunal is likely to be.
The employer's obligation to keep looking for suitable alternative vacancies lasts right up to the dismissal date.
If an employer decides to cut short the period of consultation or notice, a tribunal will want to know what employment possibilities might have arisen during the whole period when the employer should have consulted and given notice, if it had acted fairly. In King v Royal Bank of Canada Europe Limited (UKEAT/0333/10), the EAT placed the burden firmly on the employer to produce evidence of all the vacancies that arose during this period, and to explain why the dismissed employee was not suitable for any of them, given her qualifications.
Both the Richardson and the King cases involved banks, and in both cases, the employer's practice of addressing the issue of "alternative employment" by giving the redundant employee a single token "snapshot" list of vacancies was criticised as wholly inadequate.
Offers of suitable alternative employment are covered by section 141 of the ERA 96. This states that any offer must be made before the old contract ends and must begin within four weeks of the date of the end of the original employment.
The question of "suitability" of any new role and the "reasonableness" of any refusal is relevant to two issues: (1) whether the employee is entitled to a redundancy payment; and (2) whether a redundancy dismissal was fair or unfair.
The new role must be the same as, or not substantially different from, the previous work and must be suitable for the employee. The employee is not obliged to accept the alternative offered, but unreasonable refusal can lead to the loss of redundancy pay.
The issue of whether work is "suitable" is considered separately from the question of whether an employee is acting "reasonably" in refusing it, although there may be some overlap. The more suitable the offer, the easier it may be for an employer to show that the refusal to accept it is unreasonable (and conversely, the more different the new post from the old, the harder it will be for the employer to show it is suitable).
Whether work is suitable depends on objective job-related factors such as the terms and conditions, and the skills required, taking into account the skills and experience of the particular employee. By contrast, the reasonableness of any refusal to take up the offer depends on subjective factors personal to the employee. The test here is: Did this particular employee have "sound and justifiable reasons" for refusing the offer, taking into account his or her personal circumstances, and on the basis of the facts as they appeared to the employee at the time of the refusal?
Work will normally be considered unsuitable if it involves changes in pay, travelling time, skills and experience or status, while the reasonableness of the refusal may relate to issues like domestic arrangements, health and housing.
Mr Ruse was made redundant and offered suitable alternative work at the same grade but in a post which he felt to have lower status. His rejection of the offer was reasonable and he was entitled to redundancy pay.
Cambridge Co-op v Ruse [1993] IRLR 156
Mr Denton was offered an alternative job that would have meant working in a dusty environment. Even though the work was suitable, he had an obsession with the potential health hazards of airborne dust since close relatives had died from respiratory infections. The tribunal said that even though his fears were unfounded, they were genuine and this made his refusal reasonable.
Denton v Neepsend [1976] IRLR 164
Mrs Readman was made redundant from her role as a community matron and offered alternative work on the same grade as a matron in a twelve bed hospital setting. She turned it down because she felt her career path and qualifications were in community nursing. "She had not worked in a hospital setting since 1985 and had no desire to do so". This was the only difference between the two jobs. The EAT concluded that while the role was "suitable", Mrs Readman was not unreasonable in rejecting it for this reason. She was entitled to a redundancy payment.
Readman v Devon Primary Care Trust UKEAT/0116/11/ZT
During the Agenda for Change NHS reorganisation, Ms Bird was made redundant from a physiotherapy role at a PCT which involved a mix of 80% managerial and 20% clinical responsibilities. She rejected two posts that had between 15% and 20% managerial content. Her £70,000 redundancy payment was withheld by the Trust, arguing that she had unreasonably refused suitable alternative employment. Backed by her union, UNISON, she brought a tribunal claim. She was initially unsuccessful but the EAT upheld her claim, finding that her refusal of an alternative role with a different skills mix was reasonable.
Bird v Stoke on Trent PCT UKEAT/0074/11
The circumstances in which an offer is made can be relevant to the reasonableness of any refusal, especially where these have led to a deterioration in the relationship between the parties (Commission for Healthcare Audit & Inspection v Ward UKEAT/0579/07/JOJ).
The special position of disabled employees
There are a number of cases illustrating how the duty to make reasonable adjustments can strengthen the position of a disabled employee whose role is eliminated through redundancy:
Kent CC v Mingo [2000] IRLR 90, involved a collectively agreed redeployment policy under which council staff at risk of redundancy were given priority in relation to redeployment opportunities over employees needing to be redeployed because of their disability. Mr Mingo was repeatedly turned down for internal jobs in favour of staff at risk of redundancy. The EAT held that the policy discriminated against the disabled, and that it would have been a reasonable adjustment to consider him for redeployment before non-disabled staff at risk of redundancy. The EAT found that the manager was more concerned with achieving "fairness" for everyone, than with making adjustments for Mr Mingo.
The fact that others may be disadvantaged by an adjustment made for a disabled person is irrelevant to the question whether it is reasonable. The case also illustrates how individual statutory rights will trump collective agreements where the two clash.
Kent CC v Mingo [2000] IRLR 90
In Archibald v Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32, Mrs Archibald became unable to do her job as a road sweeper because of a disabling back injury. The House of Lords (now Supreme Court) decided that it would have been a reasonable adjustment for the Council to consider offering her another role she was capable of performing, without being required to go through a competitive interview process.
There is no obligation to "red circle" (protect) a disabled employee's terms and conditions. If the new job is on a lower rate of pay and the employee accepts it, the employer does not have to maintain the terms and conditions from the previous post (British Gas Services v McCaull [2001] IRLR 60). Nor is there a requirement on the employer to dismiss other employees to make way for a disabled employee whose job has been made redundant.
In Travis v Electronic Data Systems Limited (EWCA Civ 880), the claimant suffered from schizophrenia. His job was at risk of redundancy and time off work due to his disability meant that he had lost the security clearance needed to secure redeployment. The EAT decided that a reasonable adjustment would have been to provide the training needed to enable him to regain that clearance so that he could be redeployed elsewhere in the organisation.
The special position of women on maternity leave
The obligation to look for alternative employment is much stricter for women made redundant when pregnant or on maternity leave. Regulation 10 of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999 gives important rights to an employee whose role becomes redundant while on maternity leave.
It says that where an employee's role becomes redundant during maternity leave and a "suitable available vacancy" exists, she is entitled to that vacancy, regardless of whether she is the best candidate. The work must be both "suitable" for the employee and "appropriate for her to do in the circumstances" and it must be on terms not "substantially less favourable" than those of her old contract.
A recent case, Simpson v Endsleigh Insurance Services Ltd & Ors UKEAT/0544/09, confirmed that it is for the employer to decide whether a particular vacancy is appropriate for the employee's skills and suitable, taking into account what he knows about the employee, including her personal circumstances. All parts of the regulation must be satisfied before the employer is obliged to offer the post. Surprisingly, there is no obligation to consult with the employee before deciding whether the vacancy is suitable.
In other words, the employer must decide whether a vacancy is "suitable" and "appropriate" and the vacancy must be on terms not materially worse than her existing contract terms before the employer becomes obliged to offer it to the employee.
In the Simpson case, the employer was not obliged to offer a position to Ms Simpson, made redundant while on maternity leave, because the vacancy would have required both relocation and a longer shift pattern, meaning that it was on "substantially less favourable" terms.
Especially given the narrow interpretation of this regulation by the tribunal, it is vital that employees on maternity leave during a redundancy consultation process engage proactively with the employer, and communicate clearly (and in writing, for example by email) any willingness to accept "less favourable" terms to avoid redundancy, for example, a job share, part-time work or relocation.
The statutory trial period
Employees have the right to a statutory trial period of four weeks in the new job. These four weeks are defined as calendar, not working weeks (Benton v Sanderson Kayser [1989] IRLR 19).
The employer should give the worker a written copy of the agreement specifying the terms and conditions of the new work and the date of termination of the trial period (section 138, ERA 96).
If an employer refuses to offer a trial period, the employee can claim unfair dismissal (Elliot v Richard Stump [1987] IRLR 215). If the employee agrees to a trial period in the new job they will still be entitled to redundancy pay if the post proves unsuitable, as long as they reject it within that trial period. If they work beyond the four weeks, they will lose the right to statutory redundancy pay ((Reality (White Arrow Express) Ltd v O'Hara EAT/0447/03).
Although the statutory trial period cannot usually be extended without losing the right to a statutory redundancy payment (except for the purpose of retraining), negotiators can sign contractual agreements which give longer (but not shorter) trial periods (Inchcape Retail v Large EAT/0500/03).
A refusal of a trial period may make it harder to show that a new job was unsuitable, but this will depend on how different it is from the old job.
Looking for work
While under notice of redundancy, employees have the right to reasonable time off with pay during working hours to look for alternative work, provided they meet the qualifying conditions (set out below).
There is no fixed amount of time off that employers should give. If an employer refuses time off or payment for time off, employees can make a claim to a tribunal (section 52, ERA 96), but the maximum an employer can be ordered to pay is 40% of weekly earnings. The complaint must be made within three months of the employer's refusal.
Qualifying for redundancy rights
To qualify for statutory redundancy pay and time off to look for work, an employee must have been continuously employed for two years by the date of dismissal, regardless of working hours.
Employees do not qualify for statutory redundancy pay if they:
• accept suitable alternative employment;
• unreasonably refuse suitable alternative employment;
• are dismissed for misconduct (section 140, ERA 96).
Crown employees
Crown employees are not entitled to statutory redundancy pay or time off, but civil servants are entitled to better than statutory redundancy under their civil service redundancy scheme and to time off to look for work. The benefits payable under the scheme have, however, been significantly scaled back as a result of changes introduced by the coalition government.
A judicial review challenge was mounted by unions in 2011, based on the Human Rights Act, but it was ultimately unsuccessful. The challenge began under the previous government with the case of R (Public and Commercial Services Union) v Minister for the Civil Service [2010] EWCH 1027, in which the High Court agreed with the unions that the government had acted unlawfully by failing to obtain the consent of all unions to its proposed changes. Consent was required under the terms of the Superannuation Act 1972, under which the scheme was originally made.
However, the coalition government responded to this ruling by enacting replacement legislation - the Superannuation Act 2010 -removing the unions' right to withhold consent. Next, the government brought forward a new scheme, which introduced a significant cut in the scale of benefits, and re-opened negotiations on the basis of the new scheme. Some crown employees have had their compensation on leaving the service cut by as much as 40% as a result of these changes.
Two unions, the PCS and the Prison Officers Association, mounted a further judicial review challenge to the new scheme. In R (Public and Commercial Services Union v Minister for the Civil Service [2011] IRLR 903, the Court agreed with the unions that benefits under the old scheme were protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, and also that the government's actions "interfered" with those rights. But the Court ultimately decided against the unions by concluding that the cut in benefits was "reasonable and commensurate" and did not go beyond what was needed to meet the "legitimate aim" of reducing the budget deficit.
PCS has confirmed that cuts to the compensation scheme remain part of its overall national campaign against cuts to jobs, pay and pensions, and that it is "committed to carrying on the fight both industrially and politically".
Fixed term contracts and redundancy
Employees on a series of fixed-term contracts may be entitled to redundancy pay at the expiry of a contract (Pfaffinger v City of Liverpool Community College [1996] IRLR 508). Employers can no longer get temporary employees to sign waiver clauses and so avoid paying them redundancy pay.
Leaving work early
Employees will lose the right to claim statutory redundancy pay if they leave work before the redundancy notice is issued (Secretary of State for Employment v Greenfield EAT/147/89). However, employees under notice of redundancy can agree with their employers to extend the notice, for example, in the hope of work picking up, without jeopardising redundancy entitlement (Mowlem Northern v Watson [1990] IRLR 500).
If an employee agrees to an earlier termination date, the three-month time limit for bringing an unfair dismissal claim will run from that earlier date (Palfrey v Transco plc [2004] IRLR 916).
The time limit for making a claim for statutory redundancy pay is six months from the date when the contract ends. But if an individual wants to claim that the dismissal decision was unfair, the time limit is the normal three months from the date of dismissal. These deadlines are rarely extended (see Chapter 10: Dismissal).
Redundancy payments
Statutory redundancy pay is calculated using a statutory formula based on age and length of service, which awards a number of "weeks' pay".
Starting at the termination date and counting backwards, statutory redundancy pay is calculated as follows:
• half a week's pay for each full year of employment when the employee was aged below 22;
• a week's pay for each year aged 22 to 40; and
• a week-and-a-half's pay for each year aged 41 or over.
Directgov provides an online "ready reckoner" for calculating statutory redundancy pay, available at: www.direct.gov.uk/redundancy.dsb
The maximum amount of a week's pay is subject to a statutory cap revised every year on 1 February. It is currently £430 (2012-13). The maximum number of years of employment that can be taken into account is 20. This makes the maximum statutory redundancy pay £12,900 (2012/13).
Redundancy pay is calculated based on an employee's earnings at the time of the redundancy dismissal. An employee who has previously worked full-time but transfers to part-time work will have all his or her statutory redundancy pay calculated at the part-time rate and the fact that s/he previously worked full-time is not reflected in the redundancy calculation. In Barry v Midland Bank [1998] IRLR 138, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) confirmed that this practice although indirectly discriminatory against women, is nevertheless lawful. It is therefore crucial that employees who agree to work reduced hours and/or for lower pay to try to avoid redundancy negotiate an agreement that any redundancy payout is based on their full-time pay, should redundancies prove unavoidable.
The employer must give the employee a written statement saying how redundancy pay is calculated (section 165, ERA 96) and must also inform the representative. Employers can be fined for failing to comply with this requirement.
Employers can offer enhanced redundancy pay that is better than the statutory scheme. Any scheme that uses age-based or length of service-based calculations is potentially unlawful under the age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (EA 10), but there is an automatic exemption for schemes that are based on the statutory formula:
Under paragraph 13 of Schedule 9 to the EA 10, a redundancy scheme will not be age discriminatory if it amends the statutory scheme in any of the following ways:
• by exceeding (or removing altogether) the statutory cap on a week's pay;
• by multiplying the amount for each age band; or
• by multiplying the total amount by a figure of more than one.
An employer is free to devise its own redundancy scheme, but any scheme based on different criteria from those in the statutory scheme must be "objectively justified" if challenged as age discriminatory.
A policy that pays the same to everyone, for example, a scheme paying a month's pay per year of service to every employee regardless of age, will not no need justification, as there will be no age discrimination.
Establishing a contractual right
Unless an enhanced redundancy scheme is expressly incorporated into the contract, it can be difficult to establish a contractual entitlement. In Albion Automotive v Walker EAT/415/00, the EAT set out a series of criteria that must be met for a scheme to be a contractual term:
• the terms have been drawn to the employees' attention and are well-known;
• the terms have been followed for a substantial period of time;
• the terms have been followed on a number of occasions;
• payments have been made more or less automatically;
• when communicating with staff, management have used language indicating they intend to be bound;
• it was adopted by agreement with workplace representatives;
• its terms were incorporated into a written agreement;
• employees had a reasonable expectation that they would be applied.
If the policy clearly adopts the language of entitlement to explain redundancy payment terms, whether in a contract or some other document, the employer must make the promised redundancy payments:
Christopher Keeley had a written statement of employment terms setting out his main terms of employment but it was silent as to redundancy. However, the statement referred to a company handbook where staff could obtain further information. The handbook included a section headed "Employee benefits and rights", which contained the redundancy policy and stated: "Employees with two or more years' continuous service are entitled to receive an enhanced redundancy payment." Even though the whole handbook was not contractual, the Court of Appeal held that a written term "put in clear terms of entitlement" can be part of the contract, even if other terms in the same document are not. The Court said that a redundancy entitlement is an important part of an employee's remuneration package, and this made the statement particularly "apt for incorporation", which meant that it was a contractual entitlement and Keeley was entitled to the enhanced pay.
Keeley v Fosroc International Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1277
This principle was followed recently in Arkley v Sea Fish Industry Authority UKEAT/0505/09/101, a decision in which an employer tried to avoid paying benefits under a contractual redundancy policy because a change to pensions legislation meant that the agreed redundancy benefits package became extremely expensive. Nevertheless, the Court held the employer to its bargain. The language of the policy was clear. It was written in obligatory not discretionary language, stating, for example, that: "Compensation in accordance with the scheme will be payable". The employer was contractually obliged to make the payment, no matter how expensive it had become.
In Harlow v Artemis International [2008] EWHC 1126, an employee successfully obtained access to a collectively agreed enhanced redundancy policy. The High Court held that the policy was identifiable as an entitlement, the method of calculating payment was clearly set out and the policy was expressly referred to in individuals' contracts of employment.
In Hussain v Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust [2011] EWHC 1670, the High Court produced new guidance on the incorporation of collectively agreed terms into individual contracts of employment. It is summarised below:
• The Court will always start by asking whether the employee and the employer intended the term to have contractual status.
• In any collective agreement, some provisions may have contractual status, while others may be "aspirational" or amount to "guidance", or advice. There is no single test to determine whether the status of any particular term, but relevant factors include:
• the importance of the provision to the contractual working relationship or to the "overall bargain";
• the level of detail in the provision;
• the level of certainty as to what the provision requires: a vague provision is less "apt" to have contractual status;
• the context of a provision - where it sits within the overall agreement. A provision included amongst other contractual provisions is more likely to have contractual status than one included among other provisions containing guidance or aspiration;
• whether it is workable or makes "business sense" (see Malone v British Airways [2010] EWCA 1225);
• choice of wording can be significant, although just because a clause uses words like "should" rather than "must", this does not necessarily mean the parties did not intend the clause to be contractual.
In Kaur v MG Rover ([2005] IRLR 40), the Court of Appeal held that a collective agreement containing a "no compulsory redundancy" clause did not make an employee's redundancy unfair. It found that the clause was "aspirational" only and was not a contractual entitlement.
As a general rule, redundancy selection procedures are far less likely to be contractually enforceable than policies on enhanced redundancy payment terms.
In Pellowe v Pendragon PLC (EAT/804/98), the practice of paying enhanced redundancy was always followed, without individual decision or discretion, for more than ten years and more than 100 redundancies. It might have been in force for at least 20 to 25 years. Even so, the EAT did not overturn a tribunal's conclusion that there was no implied term to pay enhanced redundancy, especially as this was a management policy that was not communicated to employees.
If payments are discretionary, so that on any occasion, the employer can decide whether or not to make them, there will be no custom and practice. For example in Quinn v Calder Industrial Materials [1996] IRLR 126, the fact that the employer had previously paid enhanced redundancy but never included it as a contractual term meant that there was no custom and practice for later redundancy rounds, because on each occasion, management met to decide whether to make the enhanced payment.
When deciding whether or not to exercise discretion to pay enhanced redundancy, management decisions must not be "irrational or perverse" (Commerzbank v Keen [2007] IRLR 132 CA). In practice, proving this is a high hurdle for employees to overcome.
Employers cannot avoid paying contractual redundancy pay by deliberately choosing to dismiss an employee for another reason:
Mr Jenvey was dismissed for asserting his statutory right to a written statement of his terms after his employer tried to reduce his hours.
His employer argued that because it had dismissed him for another (albeit unfair) reason, he had no right to redundancy pay. The High Court rejected the argument. It held that if an employer was intending to dismiss for redundancy (which it found it was in this case), and there is a redundancy situation, it cannot dismiss for another reason without very good cause. It suggested the only likely permissible cause would be gross misconduct.
Jenvey v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2002] EWHC 927(QB) ([2002] IRLR 520)
An employer cannot impose criteria that discriminate on unlawful grounds to decide entitlement to redundancy pay. For example, a contractual redundancy scheme excluding employees over state retirement age would be unlawful age discrimination.
For local government employees, there is a separate statutory scheme, set out in the Local Government (Early Termination of Employment) (Discretionary Compensation) (England and Wales) Regulations 2006 (which replaced the 2000 regulations). It allows for a maximum of 104 weeks' pay, based on actual earnings and not the £430 maximum.
As an alternative to redundancy compensation, local government employers are allowed to enhance pensions, by adding up to a maximum of 10 additional years to the service of employees aged over 55, or alternatively to enhance pensions by up to £5,000 per annum (Local Government Pension Scheme (Benefits, Membership and Contributions) Regulations 2007).
Redundancy pay (both statutory and contractual) is tax free up to £30,000. However, employees and reps must be cautious because "emoluments" (such as wages or notice pay) within a settlement will be taxable (Richardson (Inspector of Taxes) v Delaney [2001] IRLR 663). Negotiators should take professional advice if in doubt.
If the employer cannot pay statutory redundancy compensation because of insolvency, it becomes payable, under section 182 of the ERA 96, by the Secretary of State.
Unfair dismissal and redundancy
There are circumstances in which redundancy is unfair and the employee can bring a claim for unfair dismissal.
A redundancy dismissal will be automatically unfair under section 105 of the ERA 96 if the reason (or if more than one, the main reason) for selection was one of the following:
• a union-related reason (including union recognition);
• participating in protected (i.e. official) industrial action;
• a health and safety reason;
• asserting a statutory right (for example, the right to request flexible working);
• taking or requesting leave for family reasons;
• being a trustee of a pension scheme;
• standing as a candidate for, acting as, or being elected as an employee representative for collective redundancy or TUPE purposes, or as a rep under the ICE regulations or of a European Works Council;
• refusing to work on a Sunday (if the employer is a shop or betting shop worker);
• asserting a right under the Working Time Regulations;
• asserting rights under the National Minimum Wage Regulations;
• making a protected disclosure (whistle-blowing);
• asserting rights under the Tax Credits Act 2002;
• asserting a right protected by the Part-time Workers Regulations 2002;
• asserting a right protected by the Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002;
• asserting a right to request flexible working;
• asserting a right to request time off to study and train;
• a reason related to a prohibited list (a "blacklist") under the Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010;
• asserting a right under the European Public Limited-Liability Company Regulations 2009; and
• being absent on jury service.
There is no need to have one years' service (two years' for dismissals where the employment began on or after 6 April 2012) to claim unfair dismissal where redundancy relates to one of the reasons listed above. Instead, the right is available from the start of the employment.
A redundancy may be unfair if there is no genuine redundancy situation, and there is no other fair reason for dismissal. It may also be unfair because it is unreasonable in the circumstances. This could be because there was poor (or no) consultation, an unfair selection procedure or a failure to offer alternative employment. In these cases the usual unfair dismissal qualifying conditions do apply i.e. employees must have one year's service (two years for employees starting a new job after 6 April 2012).
It is very difficult to challenge scores awarded by an employer in a redundancy programme. "Good faith assessments by an employer of an employee's qualities are not normally liable to be second-guessed by an employment tribunal" (Inchcape Retail Limited v Symonds UKEAT/0316/09). The tribunal will never engage in close scrutiny of scores, and as long as the employer has used a fair process, in which each individual employee has been given the opportunity to challenge his or her selection, then in the absence of discrimination, bias or factual error (for example, making a decision based on a wrongly calculated absence record or length of service) a challenge will be unlikely to succeed.
A series of cases in 2011 illustrate how on the whole, when it comes to issues of procedural fairness, tribunals tend to adopt an increasingly "employer-friendly" position. For examples, see Dabson v David Cover and Sons Ltd UKEAT/0374/10/SM, Semple Fraser LLP v Daly UKEATS/0045/09/B1, First Scottish Searching Services Limited v McDine UKEAT/S/0051/10, Morgan v The Welsh Rugby Union and Samsung Electronics (UK) Limited v Monte-d'Cruz.
In practice, an employee who wants to challenge a redundancy dismissal (especially in the absence of an automatically unfair reason for selection) should aim to produce clear, hard evidence that s/he has been prejudiced in some concrete way by an employer's decision to carry out the process in a particular way, and that if the redundancy consultation had been carried out correctly, s/he may not have been selected at all.
Employees should engage proactively in the consultation process and the search for alternative employment. If willing to accept jobs at a lower grade or reduced hours, this should be spelled out during the consultation process, keeping a careful chronological record, backed up by supporting emails.
An employee intending to bring a claim in the employment tribunal should keep searching for work and keep a careful record of the job search, including copies of all job applications (and a record of all online applications) to show the tribunal.
If an employee succeeds in a case of unfair dismissal then the redundancy payment will be offset against the basic award (i.e. they will receive only one or the other). Any contractual redundancy payment received, over and above the statutory minimum, will be offset against the compensatory award (Digital Equipment v Clements [1998] IRLR 134). See Chapter 10: Dismissal - Compensation).
An employee who brings a claim for statutory redundancy pay will be deemed to have been dismissed on grounds of redundancy and there will be no opportunity to challenge the reason for dismissal. An employee who wants to argue that the reason for dismissal was not redundancy, or that the redundancy decision was unfair, should claim compensation for unfair dismissal.
State benefits
Workers who have lost work either through unfair dismissal or redundancy may be entitled to Jobseeker's Allowance or Employment and Support Allowance.
General guidance
Acas has produced a Guide to redundancy handling which can be downloaded at: www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=747
The Acas Code of Practice on discipline and grievance (2009) (see Chapter 10: Dismissal) does not apply to ordinary redundancy consultation meetings. However, it does apply to individual grievance meetings about the redundancy process alleging, for example, discriminatory treatment or unlawful selection.
More information: See the LRD booklets Redundancy law - a guide for union reps (£6.10) and State benefits and tax credits (2012) (£7.60). LRD's Workplace Report has regular quarterly updates on redundancy law.