Major accident hazards

The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015 (COMAH) came into effect on 1 June 2015, revoking the COMAH Regulations 1999.

The COMAH Regulations aim to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and limit the consequences to people and the environment of any accidents which do occur. The 2015 Regulations implement the majority of the so-called “Seveso III” European Directive although the land-use planning requirements are implemented through planning legislation.

Although many duties will be familiar from the 1999 Regulations, the 2015 Regulations contain some new or changed duties including the following:

The list of substances covered by the Regulations has been updated and aligned to the CLP Regulation (see page 100):

• some definitions have been changed;

• there are transition arrangements for safety reports;

• for emergency planning, there is a new requirement for co-operation by designated authorities in tests of the external emergency plan;

• there are stronger requirements for public information, including a duty for lower-tier establishments to provide public information. There are provisions for electronic access to up-to-date public information;

• the domino effects duty is broader;

• there are stronger requirements for the competent authority on inspection; and

• local authorities must now inform people likely to be affected following a major accident.

The HSE advises: “For the first time, lower tier operators will have to provide public information about their site and its hazards. Both top tier (now referred to as upper tier) and lower tier operators will need to provide public information electronically and keep it up to date.”

Regulation 2 defines terms including major accident, lower and upper tier establishments, operator and dangerous substances.

The regulations apply to establishments where dangerous substances are present (or likely to be present) in quantities equal to or exceeding the quantities set out in a Schedule to the Regulations. Establishments may be either “lower tier” or “upper tier”.

An operator must take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences for human health and the environment and demonstrate to the competent authority (such as the HSE or Environment Agency) that it has taken these measures (Regulation 5).

Regulation 6 is concerned with notifications to the Competent Authority (CA). The information that must be sent includes CLP (see page 100) categories of dangerous substances and details about the site surroundings.

Operators must prepare and keep up to date a major accident prevention policy (Regulation 7 and Schedule 2). Operators of upper tier establishments must send a safety report to the competent authority demonstrating that all the necessary measures have been taken to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences to people and the environment. Safety reports must be kept up to date (Regulations 8, 9 and 10). An internal emergency plan must be reviewed and tested (Regulation 11 and 12).

A local authority in whose area there is an upper tier establishment must prepare an external emergency plan containing specified information (Regulation 13 and Schedule 4); (Regulation 15 contains exemptions to this requirement). The authority must review and test the external emergency plan (Regulation 14) and put it into effect in specified circumstances (Regulation 16).

Regulation 17 deals with the information that must be made available to the public.

Regulation 18 requires an operator of an upper tier establishment to regularly send information to people liable to be affected by a major accident occurring there (without them having to request it) and Regulation 19 requires the competent authority to adopt a procedure to deal with requests for information. Competent authorities have a range of powers, including imposing duties on groups of establishments identified as “domino” groups to co-operate.

Buncefield explosion report

A report published in February 2011 into the huge explosion at the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot concluded that fundamental safety management failings were the root cause of the disaster. Five companies were fined a total of £9.5 million for their part in the explosion and five-day fire. With estimated costs exceeding £1 billion, it was Britain’s costliest industrial disaster. Failings included:

• an absence of clear and positive safety leadership or board level involvement and competence to ensure major hazards were properly managed;

• lack of clear understanding of major accident risks and the safety critical equipment and systems designed to control them;

• lack of systems or culture that should have been in place to detect signals of failure in safety critical equipment and to respond to them quickly and effectively;

• lack of time and resources for process safety; and

• lack of effective auditing systems to test the quality of management systems and to ensure that these systems are actually being used on the ground.