Religion or belief 




The protected characteristic of religion or belief includes any religion or philosophical belief, as well as a lack of any religion or philosophical belief (Section 10, EA 10). Acas guidance states that if a belief is profound and affects someone’s way of life or worldview, it is likely to be protected. In Grainger PLC & others v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4, the EAT decided that a position on climate change and the environment could be a protected philosophical belief. In reaching this conclusion, the EAT noted how far Mr Grainger’s beliefs affected how he chose to live, such as his choice of home, method of travel and items he purchased. The EAT set the following tests for establishing whether an individual’s beliefs amount to protected philosophical beliefs. The belief must:




• be genuinely held; 




• be a belief and not simply an opinion based on the present state of information available; 




• concern a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; 




• have a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and




• be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the rights of others.




A protected belief need not be a fully-fledged system of thought. Pacifism, vegetarianism, Darwinism, humanism and atheism are probably all covered. A belief in spiritualism is covered (Power v Greater Manchester Police Authority [2010] UKEAT0087/10/0810). In Nikiel-Wolski v Burton’s Foods Limited [2013] EqLR 192, an employment tribunal ruled that a very strong belief in personal freedom and privacy, respect for personal property, freedom from authoritarianism and respect for human rights could be a philosophical belief. So can a belief in the “higher purpose” of public services broadcasting (Maistry v BBC [2011] EqLR 549), as can a profound belief that public money must not be used wastefully in the public sector (Harron v Dorset Police [2016] UKEAT/0234/15/DA).




To be protected, a belief must be genuinely held in good faith. For example, in Gareddu v London Underground [2016] UKEAT/0086/16/DM, it was not religious discrimination to refuse permission for a six-week journey to Sardinia for religious festivals because the main motivation behind the trip was really to enjoy a family reunion and holiday. 


The EHRC Code gives as an example of an unprotected belief, the belief in the racial superiority of a particular racial group. The Code states that this belief does not qualify for protection under the EA 10 because it is not compatible with human dignity and conflicts with the fundamental rights of others. 




Workers have the human right to manifest their religion at work (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights), but this right is qualified, not absolute (see Chapter 1: Human rights at work). Workers are not allowed to manifest their religion by objecting to practices that are protected by other anti-discrimination laws, such as hard-won laws prohibiting discrimination against gay, lesbian and transgender workers. This was established in the following landmark ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR):




Dismissing a worker for trying to convert work colleagues or patients to their beliefs (proselytising) is unlikely to be religious discrimination. For example, in Chondol v Liverpool City Council [2009] UKEAT 0298/08/1102, a Christian mental health worker in charge of vulnerable adults was not discriminated against when she was dismissed for giving clients copies of the Bible and visiting them outside of work unaccompanied, both of which were prohibited by her employer. She was not dismissed for manifesting her faith, but instead for going about it in a way that breached the employer’s rules and policies. 




Similarly, in Grace v Places for Children [2013] UKEAT 0217/13/0511, a claimant was not discriminated against when dismissed for holding unauthorised training sessions in which she discussed the Bible, leading to complaints from co-workers, and for disturbing co-workers with frightening predictions linked to her religious beliefs, such as suggesting that a pregnant co-worker might lose her baby. 




Likewise, in Wasteney v East London NHS Trust [2016] UKEAT/0157/15/0704, it was not religious discrimination to give a formal warning to an evangelical Christian in a senior hospital role for “grooming” a junior colleague of Muslim faith, including praying with her, laying on hands, giving her literature about conversion and inviting her to church events. This was all unwanted behaviour and improper pressure on a junior colleague. It blurred the boundaries between professional and personal, and justified the disciplinary warning.



Finally, in Trayhorn v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKEAT/0304/16/RN, it was not unlawful religious discrimination to discipline a prison employee who volunteered at the prison chapel as a Pentecostal minister and who preached that homosexuality was wrong and needed stopping and that “God hates prostitutes and gay people”. Trayhorn was disciplined for the way in which he manifested his beliefs, not for the beliefs themselves. 


For union reps, issues concerning religious discrimination are most likely to arise in the context of requests for time off and dress codes. These are looked at on pages 239 to 241.