Religion or belief
[ch 7: pages 216-217]The protected characteristic of religion or belief includes any religion or philosophical belief, as well as a lack of any religion or philosophical belief (Section 10, EA 10). In GMB v Henderson [2015] UKEAT/0073/14/DM, the EAT confirmed that philosophical beliefs deserve the same protection as religious beliefs. Acas guidance states that if a belief is profound and affects someone’s way of life or world view, it is likely to be protected. In Grainger PLC & others v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4, the EAT decided that a position on climate change and the environment could be a protected philosophical belief. The EAT noted how far Mr Grainger’s beliefs affected how he chose to live, such as his choice of home, method of travel and items he purchased. The EAT set the following tests for establishing whether someone’s belief is protected. The belief must:
• be genuinely held;
• be a belief and not simply an opinion based on the present state of information available;
• concern a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour;
• have a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and
• be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the rights of others.
A protected belief need not be a fully-fledged system of thought. Pacifism, vegetarianism, Darwinism, humanism and atheism are probably all covered. A belief in spiritualism is covered (Power v Greater Manchester Police Authority [2010] UKEAT0087/10/0810). In Nikiel-Wolski v Burton’s Foods Limited [2013] EqLR 192, an employment tribunal ruled that a very strong belief in personal freedom and privacy, respect for personal property, freedom from authoritarianism and respect for human rights could be a philosophical belief. So can a belief in the “higher purpose” of public services broadcasting (Maistry v BBC [2011] EqLR 549) and a profound belief that public money must not be wasted (Harron v Dorset Police [2016] UKEAT/0234/15/DA).
In Gray v Mulberry Co (Design) Limited [2018] UKEAT/0040/17/DA, a belief in the human or moral right to own the copyright in your own creative works (in this case, handbag designs) was not a philosophical belief. The EAT said that “having a belief relating to an important aspect of human life or behaviour is not enough in itself for it to have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief”. Permission to appeal has been granted.
To be protected, the belief must be genuinely held in good faith. For example, in Gareddu v London Underground [2016] UKEAT/0086/16/DM, it was not religious discrimination to refuse permission for a six-week journey to Sardinia for religious festivals because the main motivation behind the trip was really to enjoy a family reunion.
The EHRC Code gives as an example of an unprotected belief, the belief in the racial superiority of a particular racial group. This belief does not qualify for protection under the EA 10 because it is not compatible with human dignity and conflicts with the fundamental rights of others.
Workers have the human right both to hold a religious belief (or no belief) and to manifest that belief at work (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights). However, the right to manifest belief is qualified, not absolute (see Chapter 1: Human rights at work). Workers are not allowed to do so by objecting to practices that are protected by other anti-discrimination laws, such as hard-won laws prohibiting discrimination against gay, lesbian and transgender workers. For example, a Relate counsellor and a marriage registrar were not allowed to rely on their Christian beliefs to refuse to provide services to same sex couples (Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (and three other conjoined cases) [2013] ECHR 37).
Dismissing a worker for trying to convert work colleagues or patients to their beliefs (proselytising) is unlikely to be religious discrimination (see Chondol v Liverpool City Council [2009] UKEAT 0298/08/1102, Wasteney v East London NHS Trust [2016] UKEAT/0157/15/0704).
Employers can dismiss employees for the way in which they manifest their beliefs at work, as opposed to the beliefs themselves. For example, in Trayhorn v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKEAT/0304/16/RN, it was not religious discrimination to discipline a prison employee who volunteered at the prison chapel as a Pentecostal minister and who preached that homosexuality was wrong and needed stopping and that “God hates prostitutes and gay people”.
There can be religious discrimination where both parties share the same faith but one treats the other less favourably because of a lack of belief in an aspect of that faith (Gan Menachem Hendon Limited v de Groen [2019] UKEAT/0059/18/00).
For union reps, issues concerning religious discrimination are most likely to arise in the context of requests for time off and dress codes. These are looked at on pages 252-253.